The Indian capital market has shown signs of buoyancy and dynamism in the recent past. There is a very real need, therefore, to nurture and to give positive direction to the emerging trends in this sphere of economic activity. It is in this context that regulatory agencies have a critical role in providing the right kind of support to avoid bunching of issues as well as in protecting investors against manipulation by unscrupulous investors. Have Indian regulatory agencies risen to the occasion by formulating appropriate and adequate policies to facilitate the development of the capital markets in India?
In this article, Varma and Venkiteswaran examine the role of Indian regulatory agencies and evaluate the methodology spelt out in the official guidelines for valuation of equity shares made public by the Government of India. Management, Ahmedabad. Vol.15, No.4, October-December 1990 Objectives of Capital Issues Control Regulatory agencies throughout the world exercise substantial control over capital issues with a view to:
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• avoiding bunching of issues • protecting investors against manipulation by un scrupulous promoters.
Indian regulatory agencies would seem to be according lower priority to these two objectives and to be more concerned about ensuring a fair price to investors. The flood of new issues in the second half of 1989 and the virtual drought of issues in the first half of 1990 are a sufficient indication of regulatory failure as regards the first objective. There has also been a serious failure in respect of investor protection against misrepresentation, suppression of vital information and rampant insider trading indulged in by unprincipled company managements. While in other countries, quarterly reporting and linc-of-business profitability statements are considered minimum information requirements, the Government of India has recently taken the retrograde step of abridging the annual reports. In the name of saving on stationery costs, companies are being allowed to eliminate even the rudimentary accounting information which they were providing earlier.
As regards issue pricing, investors should normally have no cause for complaint against the prices determined by the free play of market forces facilitated by free flow of information. In India, however, it is widely believed that managements indulge in massive insider trading and price rigging especially around the time of a new issue. This is a major structural deficiency in the Indian capital market. The plethora of regulatory agencies have taken very little remedial action in this regard. Instead, it would appear that the regulatory process is designed to cure the symptoms rather than the disease. The premium fixation by the Controller of Capital Issues (CC1) is one such measure.
In a healthy and mature capital market, the regulatory agencies should have no role to play in the pricing of securities. The market mechanism would automatically guard against any over or under pricing of securities. The role of the regulators is to facilitate the free functioning of these markets by ensuring adequate disclosure of information and by eliminating insider trading and price manipulation.
Nevertheless, given the fact that, in India, the pricing of new securities is entirely determined by the CCI, it is important to evaluate the methodology specified in the official guidelines for valuation of equity shares (Ministry of Finance, 1990) . While the publication of the hitherto secret document is to be appreciated, it is worth examining whether there is any other appreciable feature in the guidelines. This paper confines itself to the valuation of shares for the purpose of determining the premium on new issues although the guidelines themselves relate to other less common purposes as well. The crux of the valuation process enunciated in the guidelines lies in the computation of the Fair Value of shares by averaging the Net Asset Value (the good old book value per share) and the Profit Earning Capacity Value (capitalized value of earnings) as summarized in the Box.
The basic flaws in the guidelines stand out in stark relief when contrasted with the market valuation process. The market values a security essentially by discounting future cashflow streams at a discount rate which reflects the degree of risk of these cashflows. As against this, the guidelines rely exclusively on past accounting data, and use a capitalization rate which is unadjusted for degree of risk. While the market captures all available information in its valuation, the guidelines make use of outdated historical data.
The guidelines themselves make it clear that fairness is the principal objective sought to be pursued during valuation. This is clear from the reference to the terms "Fair Value" (para 5) and "fair and equitable" (para 7.2). Even then, however, it docs not seem to have been realized adequately that the CCI should be fair both to existing shareholders and to new investors. Mere prudence and conservatism do not constitute fairness: in fact, conservatism is almost, by definition, unfair to the existing shareholders. It is necessary to realize that principles which areof great value to an accountant engaged in financial reporting may be anathema to the accountant engaged in valuation. There are several points in the guidelines where fairness seems to be wrongly equated with prudence (vide paras 6.2(ii), 6.2(iv), 7.5(a), 7.8 and 9.2(3)).
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Guidelines on Share Valuation
In India, the Capital Issues (Control) Act, 1947 , and the Capital Issues (Exemption) Order, 1969, define the terms and conditions for issuance of securities by the corporate sector. Under these, while certain security issues arc exempt from prior governmental authorization, no issues can be made without such approval if they arc priced higher or lower than the face (par) value. Thus, for every share issue which is proposed to be made at a premium, companies have to seek the approval of the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), the governmental agency responsible for administering the securities regulation in the country. One of the major functions of the CCI is to determine the price at which a share issue is to made. The office of the CCI has prepared for this purpose detailed guidelines for valuation of shares. The share valuation process proposed by the CCI guidelines can be summarized as follows:
• The "Fair Value (FV)" of a company's shares is to be com putcd by averaging the values obtained by the "Net Asset Value (NAV)" method and the "Profit Earning Capacity Value (PECV)" method. These computations are to be largely based on audited accounts of the recent past.
• The market price of the company's share based on the previous three years' high-low would only be kept "in the background" and is to be largely used for fine-tuning the FV,
• The NAV is nothing but the traditional book value per share computed on the basisof the latest published annual accounts.
• The PECV is to be calculated in the normal course by capitalizing the average of the after tax profits for the preceding three years at specified capitalization ratesand dividing the resultant fig ure by the number of equity shares.
• The capitalization rates arc different for trading, manufacturing and "intermediate" companies. The PECV is to be recomputed by using lower capitalization rates in the case of shares which arc highly regarded by the market. Similarly, there arc specific suggestions for computing the average in cases of high variability of profits.
• There arc also definitions specifying in detail the various inclusions and exclusions in computing NAV, PECV and average market price.
Vikalpa
Apart from these fundamental conceptual flaws which permeate the entire guidelines, there are serious weaknesses and inconsistencies in the computational specifics. We shall now discuss these in detail.
Computation of Net Asset Value (NAV) Adjustment for the Proposed Issue
The guidelines require that in computing the book value or NAV, the effect of the proposed issue of capital should be taken into account by adding the face value of the fresh issue of capital to the net worth as at the latest balance sheet date and by dividing the resulting net worth by the enlarged capital base including the fresh issue (para 6.2(0). As long as the unadjusted book value is above face value, the effect of the adjustment prescribed by the guidelines will be to reduce the book value.
The very notion of adjusting book value to reflect the dilution caused by a fresh issue is based on a total misconception. If the fresh issue is to be made at a premium, the net worth after the issue should include the proposed premium in addition to the face value. There is no reason to exclude the proposed premium while adjusting the book value. It is readily seen that the post-issue book value is given by cither of the following formulas in terms of the unadjusted book value:
It is clear that if a new issue is made at below the old (unadjusted) book value, the post issue book value will be: a) below the old book value, and b) above the issue price. Such an issue will, therefore, leave the old shareholders with a book value below that of the value before the issue. It will also give the new shareholders a book value exceeding what they paid in. The CCI formula is, therefore, unfair to existing shareholders and more than fair to new shareholders.
The above formulas make it very clear that the book value should not be adjusted for "dilution" at all; this will ensure that the new book value including the new share premium will be equal to both the old book value as well as to the issue price.
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Revaluation of Assets
The guidelines do not recognize revaluation of fixed assets unless this has taken place "long ago, say nearly 15 years ago" (para 6.2(iii)). In the absence of revaluation, the balance sheet values of assets are far divorced from the current market price, especially when the assets include large blocks of land and building acquired decades ago. Any "fair" valuation should reflect the current market values of these old assets. Hence, instead of ignoring revaluation altogether, fairness demands that all companies which come to CCI for valuation should be compelled to revalue all their assets especially land and buildings.
Similarly, it is well known that many large companies carry investments in their balance sheets at original cost which is a small fraction of their current market value. There is no reason why such investments should not be valued realistically for the purpose of share valuation. It is also common for many companies to carry at cost intercorporate investments in and loans to associate companies whose net worth has been fully eroded. In such cases, the investments/loans should be written off or written down for purposes of valuation.
The guidelines also require that "any reserve which has not been created out of genuine profits or out of cash will not be taken into account, e.g., amalgamation reserve..." (para 6.2(iv)). In India, amalgamation requires clearance by various agencies including the High Courts which examine the fairness of the terms of amalgamation. Since the amalgamation reserve has arisen from a duly approved fair valuation process, there is no justification for ignoring it in a subsequent share valuation.
Depreciation
The guidelines recognize straight line method (SLM) or written down value (WDV) method of depreciation provided the company has consistently followed that method (para 6.2(viii)). For any fair valuation, it is more appropriate to use SLM depreciation on replacement cost as this is most likely to reflect the true economic value of the assets. Failure to insist on a uniform depreciation policy can lead to an anomalous situation where a company which follows WDV depreciation is valued lower than a comparable company which follows SLM depreciation. This is illustrated by a simple example (See Table 1 ).
The guidelines disallow any changeover from WDV to SLM unless the changeover had taken place before five years. In other words, where there has been a change in the depreciation policy from WDV to SLM within the last five years, the guidelines seek to rework the depreciation on WDV basis and ignore the SLM depreciation provided in the books. For this purpose, companies are required to furnish the depreciation claims for income tax purposes to enable the CCI to determine the WDV depreciation. Under the Companies Amendment Act, 1988, the rates of SLM and WDV depreciation to be provided in the books have been specified in Schedule XIV; these rates are now totally delinked from the income tax rates. As such, recomputing depreciation on the basis of income tax claims is anomalous.
Profit Earning Capacity Value (PECV) Capitalization Rate
As per the guidelines, "The Profit Earning Capacity Value" (PECV) will be calculated by capitalizing the average of the after tax profits at the following rates:
(i) 15% in the case of manufacturing companies,
(ii) 20% in the case of trading companies, and (iii) 17.5% in the case of 'intermediate' companies that is to say, companies whose turnover from trading activities is more than 40%, but less than 60% of their total turnover." (para 7.1)
There arc also provisions to modify the PECV computation in certain cases as discussed later.
The CCI's method of determining the capitalization rate is peculiar. Finance theory suggests that the capitalization rate is a function principally of the degree of risk of the profit stream, i.e. the more risky business should be capitalized at a higher rate. On the other hand, the factor to which the CCI attaches greatest importance is whether the company is in trading or manufacturing. The implicit suggestion that trading companies arc more risky than manufacturing companies is devoid of theoretical or empirical support. Very often, an established trading company carries far less risk than a relatively new manufacturing company. Again, the CCI's demarcation of intermediate companies in terms of percentage of sales from trading activity is also unsound: percentage of profits is obviously the more relevant criterion.
Finance theory asserts that companies with substantial leverage (high debt/equity ratio) should be capitalized at higher rates reflecting higher degree of risk. The CCI's formula docs not explicitly consider leverage at all in determining the capitalization rate.
It is also not at all clear how finance, leasing and investment companies will be fitted into the valuation scheme. The distinction between finance and nonVikalpa finance companies is more important than the putative distinction made by the CCI between trading and manufacturing.
Moreover, within manufacturing or trading, different lines of business have totally different risk profiles; the CCI uses omnibus rates of capitalization, ignoring these variations completely.
The guidelines provide for relaxation of the normal capitalization rate only for a manufacturing company under the following circumstances:
• When the market price of its share is substantially above the average of NAV and PECV at 15% capitalization.
• Where a company has a "high profitability rate as revealed by the percentage of after tax profits to the equity capital of the company." • "Where the company has diversified its activities and is a multi unit company as a result of which it would be in a position to sustain its overall profits even if any one part of its operations runs into dif ficulties." (para 7.
2)
The CCI's proposal to measure the profitability rate in terms of return on equity capital instead of the widely used return on net worth is erroneous. Furthermore, since, for a profitable company, high leverage has the effect of magnifying the profitability rate, the CCI formula would end up granting a lower capitalization rate to highly levered companies. In fact, a higher capitalization rate is appropriate for such companies consistent with their higher risk proneness.
The assumption in the guidelines that diversified and multi unit companies have greater capacity to sustain overall profits is not borne out by empirical work. It is fairly well established that companies which stick to their knitting or undertake only related diversification have shown greater consistency in long-term performance. Moreover, finance theory tells us that if the relevant measure of risk is systematic (nondiversifiable) risk, then diversification should not make a difference, as shareholders themselves have the freedom to diversify their respective portfolios.
Computation of Average Profits
The guidelines state that "The crux of estimating the Profit Earning Capacity Value lies in the assessment of the future maintainable earnings of the business. While the past trends in profits and profitability would serve as a guide, it should not be overlooked that valuation is for the future and that it is the future maintainable
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stream of earnings that is of great significance in the process of valuation. All relevant factors that have a bearing on the future maintainable earnings of the business must, therefore, be given due consideration" (para 7.3). However, the computational methodology propounded in the guidelines bears no relation to these lofty ideals. In fact, the entire concept of the future maintainable earnings would appear to be only an obiter dictum. The operative part of the guidelines largely confines itself to the average of the last three to five years profits as per audited accounts. There is an implied assumption that the recent past will replicate itself into perpetuity.
The guidelines propose greater weightage for the most recent year's performance when past profits show a steadily increasing or decreasing trend (para 7.6(3)). Where it has been determined that profits show a steady trend, one would have expected the future maintainable profits to be estimated by extrapolating the trend.
The guidelines assert that "If a business has sustained losses in all the three years or even in the latest two years, the PECV will have to be regarded as nil because it would not then be realistic to assume that the business would earn profits in the near future" (para 7.6(4), emphasis added). This assertion is outrageous. Indeed, if it were true that the business would earn no profits in the near future, there is no justification for allowing it to raise scarce capital, and perhaps, there is every justification for winding up the company under the just and equitable clause (Section 433(1 )(f) of the Companies Act, 1956). Unlike the CCI, the stock market values a company realistically on the basis of its future prospects despite past losses.
Taxation
In computing the average profits, provision for taxation, with some exceptions, is to be "assumed at the current statutory rate under the income tax" (para 7.5). This assumption ignores the actual tax position of a given company which may be considerably lower for the foreseeable future due to unabsorbed capital allowances or losses or various reliefs and concessions. In the case of export oriented units and investment/leasing companies, the tax benefits could be indeed significant, and to ignore them would be grossly unfair.
Other Adjustments
While, in computing the NAV, adjustments arc required to be made in respect of depreciation changes and gratuity and other liabilities not provided for in the books, no such adjustments are prescribed for computing the average profits. In addition to these adjustments, it is also necessary to restate, at least for this purpose, the profit and loss account by incorporating various items charged directly to reserves by creative accountants.
Profitability of Fresh Issues
The guidelines propose to estimate the profitability of fresh issue of capital as follows:
• "Where the fresh issue of capital is for the purpose of financing expansion or new projects,... it could be assumed that the fresh capital would contribute to the profits upto a maximum of 50% of the existing rate of profitability. ...This will be added to the exist ing profits after tax and the total will be divided by the enlarged capital base to arrive at the future main tainable earnings per share."
• "Where the fresh capital is sought to be raised ... for general reasons like modernization and replacement of assets ... it would not be advisable to assume that the fresh capital will contribute to the profitability of the business in any tangible manner in the near future. In such cases, while the fresh issue of capital will be taken into account, no additional profits will be as sumed" (para 7.8, emphasis added).
In the case of expansion or new projects, the CCI ties the return expected from the fresh capital to the existing profit rate. It would have been more correct to estimate that the fresh capital would earn the benchmark rate of return, i.e. 15 per cent. In normal conditions, the factor of half is a grossly conservative and unfair assumption. On the other hand, a company which has just wiped out its accumulated losses can have an astronomical profitability rate simply because its net worth base is extremely small. It would be quite incorrect to assume that the fresh capital can earn half of this rate of return. Similarly, as a recent experience shows, a small company with an excellent profitability record, raising large amounts of capital for mega projects totally out of proportion to its current scale of operations would be granted an absurdly high premium on the basis of its past record. In fact, the mega project may not only be much less profitable than the existing business, but it may also drastically increase the riskiness of the company.
Again, the proposal in the guidelines to ignore future profitability of new issues made for financing modernization is contrary to the well known fact that 8 returns from such projects are more assured and less risky than returns from new projects. It may also be noted that if a new issue is made even without any specific project in mind, it is necessary to give effect to the saving in interest cost arising from the supplanted borrowings.
Market Price
The guidelines state that the average market price (based on high-low of the previous three years) "will be kept in the background as a relevant factor while settling the Fair Value (FV) unless there are reasons to believe that the market price is vitiated by speculative transactions and manipulative practices" (para 8.K2)). One may be pardoned for suggesting that, in the absence of the "vitiations" referred to by the CCI, the market price should be kept in the foreground, and that the figures obtained by various accounting calculations should be relegated to the background. In any event, it is a moot point as to how the CCI would be able to establish the incidence of "vitiation." The guidelines are somewhat naive in suggesting that a high market price vis-a-vis the FV computed in the normal course is an indication inter alia of "good reputation for the quality and integrity of [the company's] management" (para7 (2)(i)). Given the current regulatory failure in the area of insider trading, high market price could, if anything, be a reflection of lack of integrity.
The guidelines seek to revise the FV by recomputing the PECV at a lower capitalization rate whenever the original FV is significantly below the average market price (para 8.1(3)). The method of carrying out this adjustment in the fair value is inappropriate. If the market price exceeds the fair value by slightly more than 20 per cent, the guidelines reduce the capitalization rate to 12 per cent from 15 per cent, thereby increasing the capitalized value (PECV) by 25 per cent. This could lead to a situation where the new FV exceeds both the original FV and the average market value as shown in the example (Table 2) .
Vikalpa
This of course is an exceptional case; in most cases, the adjustment of FV is grossly inadequate leading to a price far below market price. It is also surprising that the guidelines do not consider the possibility that the market price may be below the average of NAV and PECV; there is no formula for adjusting the fair value in such cases.
Liquidity
The guidelines provide that "where the PECV is nil or negligible, the FV should be limited to half of the NAV. If, however, the net assets comprise mostly of liquid assets ..., the FV may be fixed upto two-thirds of the NAV or upto the actual cash and bank balances, if the latter is even higher" (para 9.2(4)). These provisions reveal a totally misplaced emphasis on liquidity in determining fair value. Equity is a long-term investment, and the liquidity of the assets comprising its book value is not a very significant consideration in valuing it.
Overall Evaluation and Recommendations
The most tangible achievement of the CCI's pricing policy so far has been the systematic underpricing of new issues. While this has no doubt helped in creating a substantial body of small investors, this creation of the equity cult has been achieved at a substantial cost in terms of massive oversubscriptions, dominance of stag operators and other undesirable side effects. Moreover, one of the effects of this policy has been to increase the effective cost of equity capital to the corporate sector. This is because a company is forced to issue a larger number of shares to raise the same amount of money when the issue price is lowered. Another major distortion is the transfer of wealth from existing shareholders to a new set of shareholders whenever the company makes an issue otherwise than on a rights basis. Whatever might have been the initial justifications for the policy of systematic underpricing, it has now definitely outlived its utility. It is, therefore, necessary to move towards a fair and realistic pricing policy.
Even the systematic underpricing has not protected the CCI from making some very serious overvaluations due to its faulty methodology. A case in point is a recent mega issue where the public investors voting with their wallets very convincingly rejected the valuation placed by the CCI. Similar overvaluation errors that have taken place in the past have not often come to light because the issues were underwritten. Serious undervaluation errors have of course been routine. Most of these valuation errors can be traced to the fundamental errors in the valuation methodology as pointed out in the Vol.15, No.4, October-December 1990 preceding analysis. The question then arises as to what is the alternative. At the very outset, we have argued that in a healthy, properly functioning capital market, there would be no reason for the regulatory authorities to intervene with the prices determined by free market forces. Any company which tried to make an issue at a price above the fair value of the share would simply find that there are no takers. The principal argument that is advanced against this proposition in India is the vitiation of the market price by rampant insider trading and manipulative practices. As we have said earlier, the solution lies in eliminating this root cause itself by strict policing and stringent action against those indulging in such illegal/unethical practices.
We believe that, in the long run, the pricing of new issues must be completely deregulated and left to market forces. However, we recognize that the elimination of illegal and unhealthy practices in the capital market is a prerequisite for such deregulation. Many advocates of deregulation may, therefore, desire a role for the CCI in the transitional phase before the markets are ready to be deregulated. We ourselves would prefer deregulation and tougher policing to go hand in hand. Nevertheless, if such a transitional role is accepted, the question arises as to what methodology the CCI should follow for determining the fair value. Our analysis of the CCI's guidelines has demonstrated that the current methodology is faulty. In the next few paragraphs, we outline what, in our view, should be the essentials of a fair valuation process. The fair value should be determined by discounting expected future free cashflows at an appropriate risk adjusted discount rate. The crux of the valuation process would, therefore, be an estimation of the future free cashflow. Free cashflow is equal to (1) net profits plus (2) non cash charges such as depreciation plus (3) net proceeds from asset disposals less (4) net changes in working, capital (exclusive of cash) less (5) capital expenditure. The cashflows would have to be forecast on a year by year basis for at least eight to ten years; beyond ten years, one would not normally attempt to forecast the annual streams. One could either estimate the value at the end of that period by taking the salvage value as one docs in most project evaluation exercises; or one could estimate a terminal value by projecting the tenth year's cashflows into the indefinite future and then capitalizing the resulting perpetuity. In many cases, most of the present value of the cashflow stream is contributed by the first ten years or so, and the terminal value is not a matter of great concern.
To arrive at any reasonable estimates for the next ten years would require segment wise forecasts. Each major line of business of the company would have to be considered separately and forecasts made of industry volume, price trends, costs, market share and investment needs (including working capital). It may not be out of place to point out here that line-of-business reporting which is required for any intelligent security analysis is totally absent in India. This information is far more important for any stakeholder than, say, the executive biodata provided under Section 217(2A) of the Companies Act. This elementary fact does not seem to have registered yet in the minds of our regulatory authorities.
The aggregate cashflows would also take into account the specific corporate level factors such as taxation, financing costs, etc. Such a discounted cashflow approach is distinctly superior in as much as it is based on a critical and realistic assessment of the future rather than a facile assumption that the future will be a replica of the recent past.
It may be noted that, in a majority of the cases, the financial institutions would anyway have made detailed cashflow projections as part of their project evaluation process. In this context, it may be recalled that institutional appraisal has now become mandatory for all large issues even where no direct institutional lending is involved.
Segment wise data may again be useful for determining the capitalization rate required for discounting the cashflows. We are very strongly of the view that the discount rate should reflect the overall degree of risk of the company. Modern finance theory provides some useful models for this purpose.
If this methodology appears to be considerably more complicated than what is currently being practised, the reason is that fair valuation is indeed not that easy. But if what the CCI wants is a simple method of obtaining a price with a strong element of inbuilt conservatism, we have a suggestion to offer which is simplicity itself: define the fair value to be equal to, say, 80 per cent of the lowest market price that has prevailed in the last one or two years. It is our submission that this simple formula will be better than the CCI's current formula in terms of accuracy, objectivity, simplicity and conservatism. It is too naive to assume that the government bureaucracy has superior skills, knowledge and business sense to value a business better than the market.
